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I. Introduction 
 
A former National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) 
athlete has filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of past and 
current NCAA athletes against their former universities and 
those universities’ sports marketing agencies, for injunctive 
relief and damages arising from alleged violations of federal 
antitrust and state labor and industry laws. 
 
 J.D. Candidate, May 2019.  Jason is a Case Note and Comment Editor for 
Pace Law Review and an Associate at Messner Reeves, LLP, pending Bar 
admission.  Jason has close ties with college athletics—growing up on West 
Point, New York, his father was employed as an athletic administrator for 
the United States Military Academy.  He was also a student-athlete at Marist 
College.  Jason would like to thank his family for all of their encouragement 
and support. 
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The lawsuit, Spielman v. IMG College, arose when Ohio 
State University (“OSU”) entered into a marketing deal through 
their marketing agency, IMG College (“IMG”), with corporations 
Honda Motor Co. (“Honda”) and Nike USA Inc. (“Nike”), to hang 
banners depicting images of former college athletes at school 
sporting events.  Charles “Chris” Spielman, the named Plaintiff 
and former NCAA football player at OSU, brought this lawsuit 
because he claims that OSU and IMG unreasonably and illegally 
restrained trade by denying him the right to profit from his 
name, image, and likeness.1 
This case plays a role in the ongoing conversation of whether 
NCAA athletes should be able to receive monetary compensation 
for their contributions to amateur athletics.  Spielman alleges in 
his Complaint that the actions of OSU and IMG are contrary to 
a decision in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that 
the NCAA’s compensation rules were subject to antitrust 
scrutiny.2  A decision in this case has the potential to have a 
major effect on the current form of the NCAA. 
Spielman has filed in the District Court of Ohio, which falls 
under the jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
Spielman cites a decision made in the Ninth Circuit stemming 
from a case in which former NCAA basketball player, Ed 
O’Bannon, sued the NCAA, saying that its amateurism rules 
were an illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act because 
they prevented NCAA athletes from being compensated for the 
use of their name, image, and likeness.3  The Sherman Act 
declares illegal any conspiracy which operates to force 
unreasonable terms and conditions upon independent traders 
and unduly limits their liberty to do business in interstate 
markets.4  O’Bannon brought his case after he saw his own 
personal features being used in a video game.  He was not 
compensated for, nor did he authorize the use of these 
characteristics in the game. 
 
 
1.  Class Action Complaint at 3, Spielman et al. v. IMG College, LLC et 
al., No. 2:17-CV-00612, 2017 WL 3015658 (S.D. Ohio July 14, 2017). 
2.  O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
3.  Id.  
4.  Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/9
ARTICLE 9_MCINTYRE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2019  12:00 AM 
2018 NCAA AMATEURISM RULES 483 
The conversation regarding compensation of the collegiate 
athletes has extended to whether current NCAA athletes can 
form a players’ union.  This has been addressed directly by the 
NCAA5 after football players attempted to organize at 
Northwestern University.6  Spielman’s lawsuit gains more 
significance as this conversation continues.  It is likely that, as 
more people consider this issue, duplicative lawsuits may be 
filed in the future by former NCAA athletes who find themselves 
position comparable to Spielman and O’Bannon.  In a statement, 
Spielman has expressed his concern regarding “the exploitation 
of all former players.”7  If the case is brought before the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals and there is a decision adverse to 
Spielman, there is the potential for a circuit split, which may 
compel the Supreme Court of the United States to grant 
certiorari if requested.  This case may result in a decision that 
will open the door for former, and perhaps even current, college 
athletes to receive compensation for their contributions to NCAA 
athletics. 
 
II. Background 
 
Chris Spielman has achieved celebrity status because of his 
prowess as an NCAA athlete.  His unique talents and ability on 
the football field at OSU led to a career as a professional athlete 
and television personality.8  Spielman played for twelve years in 
 
5.  Donald Remy, NCAA Responds to Union Proposal, NAT’L COLLEGIATE 
ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-rele 
ases/ncaa-responds-union-proposal (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
6.  Loretta8, Friendly Reminder: The NCAA Invented the Term “Student-
Athlete to Get Out of Paying Worker’s Comp, SB NATION: INSIDE NU (Jan. 28, 
2014, 8:57 PM), https://www.insidenu.com/2014/1/28/5355988/ncaa-student-
athlete-kain-colter-union-workers-comp. 
7.  Athletic Staff, Spielman Sues OSU Over Use of Athletes’ Image, 
ATHLETIC (July 7, 2017), https://theathletic.com/76313/2017/07/17/spielman-
sues-osu-over-use-of-athletes-image/ (stating “[m]y concern is about the 
exploitation of all former players across this nation who do not have the 
platform to stand up for themselves while universities and corporations benefit 
financially by selling their name and likenesses without their individual 
consent. . . . My hope is that this litigation will level the playing field for those 
affected players, and that they too can benefit from the dollars flowing into 
collegiate athletics.”). 
8.  Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 8. 
3
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the National Football League (“NFL”)9 and is now employed as 
an analyst for FOX NFL.10  He was able to maintain a valuable 
reputation while he was at OSU, yet he was not able to profit 
from it while he was a student at OSU because of NCAA rules 
against compensation.11  He decided to file this lawsuit after his 
image, and the images of other prominent former players, were 
used on corporate sponsored banners that were hung at football 
games in OSU’s stadium.  The banners were a way for the OSU 
athletic association to generate revenue, as OSU entered into 
deals with Honda and Nike to sponsor the banners in exchange 
for advertising space at OSU sporting events.12  Spielman argues 
that if OSU seeks corporate sponsorships, they should engage 
the person whose name, image, and likeness they seek to use in 
the negotiations.  Clearly, Spielman’s and other athletes’ 
reputations are valuable—as evidenced by licensing deals 
between OSU, IMG, Honda, and Nike—so it is likely that 
Spielman would be able to profit if he was party to the licensing 
deal.  Because Spielman is no longer under the restraints of 
NCAA amateurism rules, he, and others in the proposed class, 
would be allowed to seek compensation for the use of his NIL if 
there is a decision in his favor. 
While not yet a federal class action, Spielman seeks class 
action status so that others similarly situated will be able to join 
the lawsuit.13  Sixty-three other former players, including Archie 
Griffin, another prominent former OSU football player, were 
also featured on the banners.14  Celebrities such as Spielman 
and Griffin may be considered among the most recognizable 
names and people associated with NCAA football because of 
their achievements on the field. 
 
9.  Id. 
10.  Chris Spielman, FOX SPORTS: PRESS PASS, 
http://www.foxsports.com/presspass/bios/on-air/chris-spielman (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2019). 
11.  Amateurism, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/ 
student-athletes/future/amateurism (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (exhibiting 
NCAA amateurism rules prohibiting student athletes from entering into 
contracts with agencies). 
12.  Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2 (showing that, while 
Honda and Nike are not named Defendants, they have been listed as co-
conspirators). 
13.  Athletic Staff, supra note 7.   
14.  Id. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/9
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OSU enjoys immense popularity across the nation, and its 
fan base is among the largest for collegiate athletics.15  It is not 
difficult to surmise why major corporations like Honda or Nike 
would seek advertising space in OSU’s sports facilities.  With the 
outstanding attendance16 at OSU football games and other 
sporting events, and through the various television deals that 
OSU has through their athletic conference, The Big Ten,17 
corporations are able to reach their target audience.  The 
advertising is not only effective,18 but also cost-efficient, 
considering that, as Spielman alleges, major parties are left out 
the negotiations completely, and do not have to be compensated 
if the current model is allowed to continue. 
Spielman and Griffin’s images are valuable because of the 
fame and celebrity that they enjoy, which is a product of their 
exemplary skill and hard work portrayed while playing football.  
OSU seeks to use these images to attract fans to their stadiums, 
so these fans can be accosted by the advertisements of major 
corporations.  In short, the corporations want to advertise in 
OSU stadiums using images of people like Spielman because his 
reputation is valuable.  However, the images that make the 
banners valuable can be acquired by OSU without compensating 
the person who owns it because of NCAA rules that promote 
amateurism.  Nevertheless, these rules shouldn’t even apply to 
Spielman because he is no longer a NCAA athlete and, therefore, 
is not subject to NCAA regulations. 
The revenue that the NCAA generates through amateur 
competition is astronomical: $871.6 million of reported revenue 
from 2011 to 2012, while the 231 NCAA Division I schools (with 
data available) generated a total of $9.15 billion during the 2015 
 
15.  Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 12. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Ryan Connors, Big Ten Confirms TV Deals With CBS, ESPN, FOX, 
LAND 10 (July 24, 2017, 1:08 PM), https://www.landof10.com/big-ten/big-ten-
tv-contract-cbs-espn-fox. 
18.  Rich Exner, Ohio State Buckeyes Sports Money by the Numbers, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 25, 2017, 11:33 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/data 
central/index.ssf/2017/03/ohio_state_buckeyes_sports_mon.html (stating 
“royalties licensing, advertisements and sponsorships brought in $17.2 
million”). 
5
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fiscal year.19  OSU accounted for $170.8 million of that total.20  
Spielman argues that the former NCAA athletes who are unable 
to profit from the reputation they created while in school should 
be allowed to do so once they are no longer under the jurisdiction 
of the NCAA regulations, and that excluding them from the 
negotiations is an unreasonable restraint on trade.21 
 
III. Jurisdictional Issues 
 
OSU is a state university funded by the public, so it is an 
extension of the state of Ohio.  In Hans v. Louisiana, the 
Supreme Court held that each state enjoys sovereign immunity 
and, therefore, cannot be sued in federal court without consent.22  
Because of this, the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to 
OSU.  Spielman has filed this lawsuit in the Southern District 
of Ohio, claiming jurisdiction on the ground that this is a 
violation of a federal law.  Ohio has partially waived its 
sovereign immunity, which means that all claims against the 
state of Ohio must be brought in the Ohio Court of Claims.23 
As mentioned, Spielman seeks class action status so all 
similarly affected plaintiffs can join the lawsuit.  It can take a 
long time to convince a federal judge to allow this case to proceed 
as a class action because he or she must consider and decide 
whether all of the plaintiffs are similarly affected.24  In the 
O’Bannon decision, it took four and one-half years before 
O’Bannon was able to obtain class action status.  However, there 
were over 10,000 plaintiffs in that case.25 
 
19.  PETER SMOLIANOV, SPORT DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: HIGH 
PERFORMANCE AND MASS PARTICIPATION 42 (Routledge 2014); Where Does the 
Money Go?, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/about/ 
resources/finances/revenue (last visited Feb. 15, 2019); see also Cork Gaines, 
The Difference in How Much Money Schools Make off of College Sports Is 
Jarring, and It Is the Biggest Obstacle to Paying Athletes, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 
14, 2016, 12:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider .com/ncaa-schools-college-
sports-revenue-2016-10. 
20.  Exner, supra note 18. 
21.  See generally Class Action Complaint, supra note 1.  
22.  134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890).  
23.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02 (LexisNexis 2012). 
24.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
25.  Jon Solomon, Inside College Sports: Here’s What’s Next for NCAA 
After O’Bannon Ruling, CBS SPORTS (Oct. 2, 2015, 1:28 AM), https://www.cbs 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/9
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Spielman has amended his original complaint and expanded 
the number of defendants to include every school that has used 
IMG as a sports marketing agency—a total of eighty-nine 
schools, including OSU.26  Spielman says that he amended his 
complaint so all former players, and all those who will become 
former players, will be protected.27  However, this also plays a 
significant part in deciding if this case should be heard in federal 
court. 
This case isn’t just about suing schools and allowing the 
class to collect damages.28  By expanding the class in such a way, 
Spielman may increase his chance to have the case heard in 
federal court.  If the case is heard in federal court, rather than 
the Ohio Court of Claims, there will be federal precedence which 
will likely dictate policy on how to compensate former players 
for the use of their name, image, and likeness. 
 
IV. Analysis 
 
A.  The NCAA and its Amateurism Rules 
 
The NCAA was founded in 1906 because of a desire and need 
to reform college football in order to make it safer and more 
regulated.29  It started as a discussion group and rules-making 
body for football, and then was expanded to other sports as more 
rule committees were formed.  The Sanity Code was the NCAA’s 
first attempt to establish guidelines for recruiting and financial 
aid.  Eventually, the current structure of the NCAA began to 
take shape.  An executive director was appointed in 1951, and a 
 
sports.com/college-football/news/inside-college-sports-heres-whats-next-for-
ncaa-after-obannon-ruling/. 
26.  Laura Newpoff, Chris Spielman Lawsuit Against Ohio State, IMG 
Expands to 89 Colleges, Impacts Thousands of Players, COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST 
(Nov. 29, 2017, 11:02 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/news /2017 
/11/28/chris-spielman-lawsuit-against-ohio-state-expands.html. 
27.  Id. 
28.  Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that he has 
demanded the minimum amount of relief allowable in federal court ($75,000) 
and that he will donate all money to the OSU athletic department); Athletic 
Staff, supra note 7. 
29.  Concussion Timeline, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www. 
ncaa.org/sport-science-institute/concussion-timeline (last visited Feb. 15, 
2019). 
7
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national headquarters was established in 1952.  Walter Byers, 
the first executive director, has been credited with inventing the 
term student-athlete in 1964 to use as a defense during litigation 
when the NCAA successfully avoided paying workers 
compensation benefits to athletes.30 
The NCAA defines an amateur as someone who has not 
profited above his/her actual and necessary expenses or gained 
a competitive advantage in his/her sport.31  Amateurism was 
adopted as a bedrock principle in order to ensure that NCAA 
athletes place first priority on obtaining a quality educational 
experience and they are all in equal competition.32  In general, 
the amateurism rule prohibits NCAA athletes from: entering 
contracts with professional teams, or any sort of agreement to be 
represented by an agent; receiving a salary for participating in 
athletics, prize money above actual and necessary expenses, or 
benefits from an agent or prospective agent; and playing, 
practicing or otherwise competing with a professional or 
professional team.33 
 
B. The Sherman Act 
 
When it was codified in 1890, the Sherman Act’s primary 
purpose was to promote and maintain competition between 
businesses in the marketplace.34  In short, the Sherman Act 
prohibits the formation and exercise of unreasonable 
monopolies.  The Rule of Reason analysis was established in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.35  
In that case, it was alleged that Defendant oil companies from 
various states and other corporations restrained trade and 
created monopolies through a deal made in 1870 by John. D. 
 
30.  Jon Solomon, ‘Schooled: The Price of College Sports’ Is a Movie Worth 
the NCAA History Lesson (Review), AL.COM (Oct. 17, 2013, 6:26 PM), 
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/10/schooled_the_price_of_college.htm
l; see also Loretta8, supra note 6. 
31.  Amateurism, supra note 11. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Christian Dennie, He Shoots, He Scores: An Analysis of O’Bannon v. 
NCAA on Appeal and the Future of Intercollegiate Athletics, 93 N.C.L. REV. 
ADDENDUM 90, 96 (2015). 
35.  221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/9
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Rockefeller and others.  The Court held that the deal fixed 
prices, limited production, and controlled transportation of 
goods when about 90% of the oil business in Ohio was controlled 
by Rockefeller and his associates.36  With that kind of control, 
the Defendants were able to force their competitors out of the 
market by giving preferential rates and rebates to customers.37  
The Court was tasked with interpreting the Sherman Act 
because the statute itself does not specifically enumerate or 
define a restraint of trade and therefore each case that claims a 
violation of the Sherman Act must be decided individually.38  In 
his opinion, Chief Justice White established that the Rule of 
Reason is, therefore, the standard intended by the statute—that 
only monopolies and restraints of trade that are decided to be 
unreasonable are illegal.39  In Board of Trade et al. v. United 
States, Justice Brandeis articulated how the rule should be 
applied.40 
 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint 
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps 
thereby promotes competition or whether it is 
such as may suppress or even destroy competition.  
To determine that question the court must 
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the 
business to which the restraint is applied; its 
condition before and after the restraint was 
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, 
actual or probable.  The history of the restraint, 
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting 
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought 
to be attained, are all relevant facts.  This is not 
because a good intention will save an otherwise 
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but 
because knowledge of intent may help the court to 
interpret facts and to predict consequences.41 
 
36.  Id. at 32–33. 
37.  Id. at 33. 
38.  Id. at 63. 
39.  Id. (emphasis added). 
40.  246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
41.  Id. 
9
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This decision established the principle that if a defendant 
can show that his alleged violations actually promote 
competition, then those actions are not unreasonable, and thus 
do not violate the Sherman Act.42 
 
C. NCAA v. Board of Regents and the Sherman Act’s Effect on 
the NCAA 
 
The Supreme Court, in its seminal decision National 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, held that the NCAA 
is by no means exempt from these restraints and can be 
subjected to scrutiny under the Sherman Act.43  Board of Regents 
involved the rights of universities that were members of the 
NCAA and their ability to independently negotiate deals with 
television networks to broadcast football games on television.  In 
order to combat the adverse effect that television was having on 
live attendance of college football games, the NCAA created a 
plan that only permitted one game per week to be broadcast in 
any given area and limited each member-university to two 
television appearances per season.  Originally, the NCAA had a 
deal with the American Broadcasting Company (“ABC”) for the 
exclusive right to broadcast these games.  In response to these 
limitations, the College Football Association (“CFA”) was formed 
to promote the interests of major football-playing schools within 
the NCAA structure.44  Later on, the NCAA entered into 
agreements with ABC and the former Columbia Broadcasting 
System (now CBS)45 allowing each network to broadcast 
fourteen games per season.46  Other restrictions included 
“appearance requirements” and “appearance limitations” which 
imposed requirements on what the networks could broadcast 
and how many times they were able to broadcast certain 
schools.47  The NCAA created a rule that “[n]o member . . . is 
 
42.  1 JOSEPH P. BAUER, WILLIAM H. PAGE & EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAWS § 8.2 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2018) (citing Board of Trade, 
246 U.S. at 240–41). 
43.  See generally 468 U.S. 85 (1984).  
44.  Id. at 89. 
45.  Harold L. Erickson, CBS Corporation, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https:// 
www.britannica.com/topic/CBS-Corporation (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
46.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 92–93.  
47.  Id. at 94. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/9
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permitted to make any sale of television rights except in 
accordance with the basic plan.”48  Displeased with this 
arrangement, the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia, as well 
as other members of the CFA, negotiated a different contract 
with National Broadcasting Company (“NBC”) which provided 
more television appearances and more money.49  The NCAA 
publicly threatened to take disciplinary action against any CFA 
member that complied with the CFA-NBC contract.50 
Horizontal price-fixing, or the artificial setting or 
maintenance of prices at a certain level, is contrary to the 
workings of a free market among competitors on the same level, 
such as retailers throughout an industry.51  Naturally, NCAA 
members compete with each other for viewers, making each of 
them competitors on the same level.  Because the NCAA’s plan 
operated to preclude any price negotiations between 
broadcasters and member-institutions, the District Court held, 
and the Supreme Court agreed, that the NCAA participated in 
horizontal price-fixing, and because the NCAA’s plan restrained 
the quantity of television rights available for sale, the plan 
created a limitation on output.52  The Court opined that these 
two practices together is “the paradigm of an unreasonable 
restraint of trade.”53  Ordinarily, horizontal price-fixing and 
output limitation are per se illegal restraints on trade, so no 
further analysis would need to be done in order for a court to 
decide that these actions are in violation of the Sherman Act.54  
However, the Court found that deciding this case on such 
grounds would not be appropriate because the NCAA provided 
sufficient  procompetitive  arguments  for these  price-fixing and  
output limitations that, by their very nature, appear to be 
distinctly anti-competition.55 
 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. at 94–95. 
50.  Id. at 95. 
51.  Price-fixing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
52.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99 
(1984). 
53.  Id. at 100 (citing Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 
344–48 (1982)). 
54.  Id., 468 U.S. at 100. 
55.  Id. at 103 (finding that, “despite the fact that this case involves 
restraints on the ability of member institutions to compete in terms of price 
11
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It would be difficult for sports leagues to exist without a 
unifying body such as the NCAA.  What they are essentially 
marketing is competition itself by creating a forum for contests 
between competing institutions.56  In order to protect the 
integrity of the product, certain rules must be followed, and 
following those rules must be a mutual agreement by all 
participating institutions.57  The NCAA is pro-competitive 
because it plays a vital role in enabling college football to 
“preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be 
marketed which might otherwise be unavailable.”58  Therefore, 
the Rule of Reason analysis was the appropriate standard in this 
case.59 
When employing the Rule of Reason analysis, Justice 
Stevens relied on a conclusion made in National Society of 
Professional Engineers v. United States, which held: 
 
[T]hat a restraint of trade is unreasonable may 
be . . . ‘based either (1) on the nature or character 
of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding 
circumstances giving rise to the inference or 
presumption that they were intended to restrain 
trade and enhance prices.  Under either branch of 
the test, the inquiry is confined to a consideration 
of impact on competitive conditions.60 
 
The NCAA argued that the television plan did not have an 
anti-competitive effect by asserting that it did not have the 
ability to alter the interaction of supply and demand in the 
market, and thus did not have market power.  The Court found 
that it did not matter whether it had market power because the 
absence of market power does not justify a naked restriction on 
price or output.  Regardless, it found that the NCAA did, in fact, 
 
and output, a fair evaluation of their competitive character requires 
consideration of the NCAA’s justifications for the restraints.”).  
56.  Id. at 101. 
57.  Id. at 102.  
58.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 
(1984). 
59.  Id. at 103. 
60.  Id. at 103 (citing Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States 435 U.S. 
679, 690 (1978)). 
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have market power.61  The Court determined that NCAA’s goal 
of protecting fan attendance at live football games was not 
effectively accomplished by limiting how many games were 
shown on television.  More significantly, the Court found that 
because the NCAA was attempting to “insulate live ticket sales 
from the full spectrum of competition because of the [NCAA’s] 
assumption that the product itself is insufficiently attractive to 
[consumers,]” they are in conflict with the Sherman Act.62  It was 
eventually decided that, even though the NCAA’s goal is to 
preserve the integrity of amateur athletics, it went too far when 
it imposed the restrictions on a member-school’s ability to 
independently negotiate television deals with broadcasters.63 
The decision in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n makes it 
clear that, not only is the NCAA not immune from scrutiny 
under the Sherman Act, but also the impact of the limitations 
imposed will be considered in determining whether it is in 
violation of the Sherman Act.64  In his complaint, Spielman 
alleges the NCAA has engaged in per se violations of the 
Sherman Act by alleging IMG and its co-conspirators Honda and 
Nike have engaged in an unreasonable restraint of trade 
through price-fixing and a group boycott or refusal to deal.65  By 
alleging per se violations, Spielman is asserting that the NCAA 
cannot make a valid argument that its practices are justified by 
being pro-competitive.  Even if a court decides that these are not 
per se violations and the Rule of Reason analysis is applied, it is 
unlikely the NCAA would be able to overcome the precedent set 
in Board of Regents because the impact of the limitation imposed 
would be considered.  The impact in Spielman’s case is that he 
does not have the opportunity to negotiate licensing deals for the 
name, image, and likeness he created, even though he is not 
 
61.  Id. at 111. 
62.  Id. at 117 (“[T]he Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on 
the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable” (alteration in original) 
(quoting National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 696)). 
63.  Id. at 121. 
64.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 121 
(1984); see also O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 
1063 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating “but the NCAA is not asking us to find merely 
that its amateurism rules are procompetitive; rather, it asks us to hold that 
those rules are essentially exempt from antitrust scrutiny” (footnote omitted)). 
65.  Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 2. 
13
ARTICLE 9_MCINTYRE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2019  12:00 AM 
494 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.1 
currently an NCAA athlete and is not bound by the pro-
competitive amateurism and compensation rules; this impact 
appears to be significant. 
 
D. The O’Bannon Decision 
 
In O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that the NCAA’s rules 
prohibiting NCAA athletes from receiving compensation for 
their name, image, and likeness violated the Sherman Act.66  
Spielman bases his Sherman Act claims on this decision,67 but a 
Ninth Circuit precedent is not binding in the Sixth Circuit, 
where his case would be heard on appeal.  What makes 
Spielman’s case more intriguing is the potential for a circuit split 
should the Sixth Circuit decide his case differently than the 
Ninth did in O’Bannon.  A circuit split on an issue that is likely 
to be raised again in other jurisdictions may compel the Supreme 
Court of the United States to weigh in. 
From the late 1990’s until about 2013, Electronic Arts 
(“EA”), a software company, produced video games based on 
NCAA football and men’s basketball.  These games would depict 
virtual images of collegiate athletes and allow users to play as 
their favorite college teams and players in their respective 
sports.68  In 2008, Ed O’Bannon, a former All-American 
basketball player at UCLA, was told by his friend’s son that his 
persona was being used in one of these video games.69  A virtual 
representation of O’Bannon, as indicated by its physical 
likeness, and other demonstrative features, such as his former 
jersey number, were among the features in the game.70  
Consequently, O’Bannon initiated a lawsuit against the NCAA 
and the company used to license trademarks, Collegiate 
Licensing Company, because he had not consented to and had 
not been compensated for the use of his likeness in the game.71 
Eventually, O’Bannon’s motion for class certification under 
 
66.  802 F.3d at 1056. 
67.  Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 4. 
68.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Id. 
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rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure72 for injunctive 
and declaratory relief was granted.73  The class was defined as: 
 
All current and former student-athletes residing 
in the United States who compete on, or competed 
on, an NCAA Division I . . . college or university 
men’s basketball team or on an NCAA Football 
Bowl Subdivision . . . men’s football team and 
whose images, likenesses and/or names may be, or 
have been, included or could have been included 
(by virtue of their appearance in a team roster) in 
game footage or in videogames licensed or sold by 
Defendants, their co-conspirators, or their 
licensees.74 
 
The District Court began their analysis by identifying the 
markets in which the NCAA allegedly restrained trade.75  The 
schools that compete with each other to recruit the best high 
school athletes do so, not only by offering scholarships, but also 
promoting their coaching expertise, athletic facilities, and the 
potential opportunity to face high-quality athletic competition.  
These schools compete in what the Court called the “college 
education market.”76  The Court found that this market is 
cognizable under the antitrust laws because there is simply no 
substitute market that would be able to provide this unique 
bundle of goods services.77  After applying the Rule of Reason 
 
72.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
73.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055. 
74.  Id. at 1055–56 (quoting O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). 
75.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056. 
76.  Id. at 1056–57.  The Court also found that there was a “group 
licensing market,” in which athletes would be able to sell group licenses for the 
use of their name, image, and likeness if not for the NCAA’s compensation 
rules.  However, it was eventually decided that the NCAA’s rules do not have 
an anticompetitive effect on this market. Id. at 1057. 
77.  Id. at 1056.  The Court made this decision after it was determined 
that “athletes talented enough to play FBS football or Division I basketball opt 
not to attend an FBS/Division I school; hardly any choose to attend an FCS, 
Division II, or Division III school or to compete in minor or foreign professional 
sports leagues, and athletes are not allowed to join either the [National 
Football League] or the [National Basketball Association] directly from high 
15
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analysis, the Court determined that the NCAA’s rules have anti-
competitive effect on the college education market, but that 
these rules serve a pro-competitive purpose.  However, these 
pro-competitive purposes could be achieved by using less 
restrictive and alternative restraints and that the rules were, 
therefore, unlawful.78  The result of this case was that schools 
were now allowed to compensate NCAA athletes on FBS football 
and Division I men’s basketball teams with grants-in-aid that 
totaled up to the full cost of attendance.79 
The NCAA argued that its rule prohibiting NCAA athletes 
from receiving compensation for their name, image, and likeness 
is pro-competitive because the rule preserves amateurism, 
promotes a competitive balance between participating schools, 
integrates academics and athletics, and increases output in the 
college education market.80  The Court agreed that amateurism 
“helps preserve consumer demand for college sports”81 and that 
integrating academics and athletics is a viable pro-competitive 
justification for the NCAA’s regulation of the college education 
market,82 but rejected the NCAA’s other arguments. 
Eventually a settlement was reached, and somewhere 
between 200,000 and 300,000 former college football players 
whose likenesses were used in the game were compensated with 
“something substantive.”83  Also, EA stopped producing the 
college football game altogether.84 
 
school.” Id. 
78.  Id. at 1057. 
79.  Id. at 1061.  The District Court also held that NCAA member-schools 
could pay student-athletes up to $5,000 per year and that these funds would 
be held in trust and distributed after the student-athlete leaves school. 
However, this holding was eventually overturned on appeal by the Ninth 
Circuit because it found that paying student-athletes in this way does not 
promote amateurism and, therefore, has a procompetitive effect. Id. at 1076. 
80.  Id. at 1058. 
81.  O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th 
Cir. 2015). 
82.  Id. at 1059–60.  However, the Court found that the benefits which 
arise from integrating athletics and academics are not the result of the NCAA’s 
rules restricting compensation, but rather other rules such as requiring 
student-athletes to attend class. Id. at 1060. 
83.  Darren Rovell, EA Sports Settles with Ex-Players, ESPN (Sept. 26, 
2013), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/9728042/ea-sports-stop-
producing-college-football-game. 
84.  Id. 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/9
ARTICLE 9_MCINTYRE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2019  12:00 AM 
2018 NCAA AMATEURISM RULES 497 
The lower Court that decided this case raised an interesting 
point that should be considered in Spielman’s lawsuit and in the 
greater conversation about whether college athletes should be 
compensated. 
 
[T]he college education market can be thought of 
as a market in which student-athletes are sellers 
rather than buyers and the schools are purchasers 
of athletic services . . . the college education 
market is a monopsony—a market in which there 
is only one buyer (the NCAA schools, acting 
collectively) for a particular good or service (the 
labor and [name, image, and likeness] rights of 
student-athletes), and the colleges’ agreement not 
to pay anything to purchase recruits’ [name, 
image, and likeness] causes harm to 
competition.85 
 
This case is significant to Spielman because there is a 
precedent, though not binding, for a federal court to hold that 
the NCAA’s rules prohibiting NCAA athletes from receiving 
compensation for their name, image, and likeness violates the 
Sherman Act.86  The District Court of Ohio and, if the case is 
appealed, the Sixth Circuit is likely to consider this decision 
when adjudicating Spielman’s claims.  The District Court’s 
statement is potentially influential to the trending culture shift 
that is taking place in which more people are starting to agree 
that not just former, but current, college athletes deserve some 
of the wealth generated in NCAA athletics.  If the view of the 
District Court—that students are sellers and schools are 
buyers—becomes a mainstream idea, then a change in the way 
college athletics are viewed by the public and governing bodies 
may develop, which could result in an opportunity for college 
athletes to receive monetary compensation. 
 
 
 
 
85.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1058 (citing O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973). 
86.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056. 
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E. The Lanham Act § 43(a) 
 
The Lanham Act allows civil remedies when someone is 
harmed by an unfair competition in a business transaction.87  
Unfair competition is defined as: “[d]ishonest or fraudulent 
rivalry in trade and commerce; [especially] the practice of 
endeavoring to substitute one’s own goods or products in the 
markets for those of another . . . by means of imitating or 
counterfeiting the name, title, size, shape, or distinctive 
peculiarities of the article . . . or general appearance of the 
package.”88  The Lanham Act allows a plaintiff to bring a federal 
civil action against any person who, in a commercial setting, 
deceives others in a way that creates confusion as to who the 
plaintiff is affiliated with.89  The element that must be shown in 
order to succeed on a claim brought under Section 43(a) is that 
the actions of the defendant are likely to cause confusion as to 
who the plaintiff is actually affiliated with commercially.90  
Courts have held that Section 43(a) should be broadly construed.  
In BBB of Metropolitan Houston, Inc. v. Medical Directors, Inc., 
the Court stated that “[l]iability under Section 43(a) is not 
restricted to literal falsehoods, but extends as well to misleading 
impressions created by the clever use of innuendo, indirect 
intimations and ambiguous suggestions.”91 
Spielman alleges that OSU used his professional 
accomplishments and goodwill to sell the merchandise of 
corporate sponsors Honda and Nike.  The Complaint specifically 
alleges that the inference which consumers were supposed to 
draw from the banners depicting Spielman’s picture was that, 
much like Spielman, the products of the corporate sponsors 
“perform at a high level.”92 Spielman makes a claim under the 
Lanham Act because he asserts that the use of his name, image, 
and likeness on a corporate-sponsored banner is likely to deceive 
people and consumers into thinking that Spielman is associated 
 
87.  CHRISTOPHER M. ERNST, BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE: OHIO TORT LAW 
§ 56:2 (West 2d ed. 2017). 
88.  Unfair Competition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2017). 
89.  Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
90.  ERNST, supra note 87. 
91.  Id. (quoting 509 F. Supp. 811, 814 (S.D. Tex. 1981)). 
92.  Class Action Complaint, supra note 1 at 22. 
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with or sponsored by Honda and/or Nike.  Ultimately, Spielman 
wants the Court to permanently enjoin the Defendants from 
using his name, image, and likeness because it amounts to 
unfair competition, as well as the minimal amount of damages 
that can be pursued in federal court—$75,000. 
Courts have applied an eight-step inquiry, known as the 
Frisch Test, in order to determine whether confusion was 
caused.93  The Frisch Test comes from a case in which the name 
of a restaurant was in dispute—a local restaurant owner wanted 
to use the same name as a corporate chain in its 
advertisements.94  The Ninth Circuit held that eight factors 
would be considered when determining if the action of the 
Defendant would likely cause confusion among consumers.  
Those eight factors are: (1) strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) 
relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence 
of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) likely 
degree of purchaser care; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the 
mark; (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.95  It should 
be noted that, as a trier of fact makes this analysis, it is not 
necessary for it to find that actual consumer confusion was 
present—imminence or threat of confusion is enough.96  
Similarly, if the trier of fact finds that the representation made 
by the defendant is precise or substantially similar then that is 
enough to presume confusion.97  When such confusion is present, 
a person may bring about a cause of action for unfair competition 
under the Lanham Act.98 
In light of this analysis, it is likely that a court would 
determine that the representation of Spielman produced by the 
Defendants on the banners without his consent would cause 
confusion among consumers.  Spielman alleges a violation of the 
Lanham Act because these corporate-sponsored banners with 
pictures of Spielman playing football at Ohio State were hung in 
 
93.  ERNST, supra note 87. 
94.  Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 
642, 644 (6th Cir. 1982). 
95.  Id. at 648 (citing Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 790 
(9th Cir. 1981)) (quoting AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th 
Cir. 1979)). 
96.  ERNST, supra note 87 at § 56:34. 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. 
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the football stadium without his permission.  The presumption 
of confusion would, therefore, be present because the 
representation of Spielman is precise—it is actually him 
pictured on the banners. 
Around the same time that O’Bannon was bringing his 
claims under the Sherman Act against EA, a video game 
developer, another former football player was bringing claims 
under the Lanham Act for similar conduct against the same 
Defendant.  Jim Brown, widely regarded as one of the best 
football players of all time,99 sued EA for using his name, image, 
and likeness in a video game.  O’Bannon brought his claims 
against EA for using these features in a video game that depicted 
college players, while Brown took issue with EA’s video game 
that depicted professional players.  EA’s Madden NFL series 
allows users to play as NFL players; some versions of the game 
allow players to play as former NFL players, such as Jim Brown.  
The NFL and the NFL Players’ Association (“NFLPA”) entered 
into licensing deals with EA to use the names, images, and 
likenesses of NFL players for their game.  Brown took issue with 
the representations of himself in the game because he was no 
longer in the NFL or the NFLPA, did not consent to the use of 
his name, image, or likeness, and was not compensated. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the appropriate 
framework to apply in this case, rather than the likelihood of 
confusion test employed in Frisch, would be the Rogers test.100  
The Court maintained that the Madden NFL series constituted 
artistic expression which is protected under the First 
Amendment, and there was precedent in the Ninth Circuit 
which held that the method for balancing rights under the 
Lanham Act and rights under the First Amendment in cases 
involving expressive works is the Rogers test.101  The Ninth 
Circuit  noted  the  Supreme Court’s precedent that video games  
are expressive works and deserve the same protection as more 
traditional forms of expression.102 
 
99.  Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 2011). 
100.  Id. at 1241–1242. 
101.  Id. (citing Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901–02 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
102.  Id. at 1241 (citing Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 
(2011). 
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In Rogers v. Grimaldi, Ginger Rogers sued producers and 
distributors of a movie for the use of a movie a title that obliquely 
related to her and a deceased entertainment partner, Fred 
Astaire.103  Rogers and Astaire are among the most famous duos 
in show business history.104  The Defendants in this case used 
their names for the title of a fictional movie, which they 
contended they were allowed to do because prohibiting them to 
do so would be a violation of their right to express themselves 
freely in their own artistic work.105  The Second Circuit 
introduced a two-pronged test which determines whether the 
Lanham Act should or should not be applied to expressive works.  
“[U]nless the [use of the trademark or other identifying 
material] has no artistic relevance to the underlying work 
whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the 
[trademark or other identifying material] explicitly misleads as 
to the source or the content of the work.”106  With this test, the 
Court held that the Defendants had not violated Rogers’ rights 
under the Lanham Act because it did not explicitly mislead 
consumers.107 
In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit held that “‘the level of 
[artistic] relevance [of the trademark or other identifying 
material to the work] merely must be above zero’ for the 
trademark or other identifying material to be deemed 
artistically relevant.”108  In Brown, the Court determined that 
without the use of Brown’s name, image, and likeness, users 
would not have been able to immerse themselves in the 
experience of playing the game with the virtual depictions of the 
1965 Cleveland Browns, of which Brown was a member.  In 
order to satisfy the Rogers test and apply the Lanham Act, 
Brown would have had to have shown that the use of his name, 
image, and likeness had no artistic relevance to the underlying 
work whatsoever.  The Court felt that the use of Brown’s 
characteristics had some artistic relevance to the Defendant’s 
 
103.  875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1989). 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. at 996–997 (noting the title of the movie was Ginger and Fred). 
106.  Brown, 724 F.3d at 1242 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999). 
107.  Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001–02. 
108.  Brown, 724 F.3d at 1243 (alterations in original) (quoting E.S.S. 
Entm’t v. Rock Star Videos, Inc. 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
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video games.109 
In Spielman’s case, he must also show that the use of his 
name, image, and likeness has no artistic relevance.  This will 
be a difficult argument for Spielman to make.  It seems that OSU 
would be able to easily assert the defense that Spielman’s image 
has artistic relevance much the same way that Brown’s did.  By 
hanging the banners of former players, OSU could say they were 
trying to create a certain atmosphere in their sporting facilities, 
and that the images they used offered a certain degree of artistic 
expression that helped in creating this atmosphere.  If OSU was 
using the name, image, and likeness of former players in a way 
that was more clearly commercial, then Spielman may have a 
better chance of arguing that there is no artistic relevance, but 
that does not appear to be the case. 
The second prong of the Rogers test requires that the creator 
use the material to “explicitly mislead[ consumers] as to the 
source or content of the work.”110  The appropriate inquiry made 
in Brown, as applied to Spielman, would be: whether the use of 
Spielman’s likeness would confuse people who attend football 
games at OSU into thinking that Spielman is somehow involved 
in the corporate sponsored banners, or that he endorses Honda 
or Nike’s products, and whether there was an explicit 
misstatement that causes the consumer confusion.111  The 
distinction that the material must explicitly mislead is crucial 
to the analysis.  In order to prevail under the Lanham Act, 
Spielman must show that OSU and IMG used his name, image, 
and likeness in a way that showed consumers that Spielman 
unequivocally endorsed the corporate sponsored banners.  It is 
not enough to show that consumers may draw an incorrect 
inference as to Spielman’s endorsement.112  For example, the 
Court in Brown determined that EA did not explicitly mislead 
consumers, despite productions of evidence that consumers were 
actually mislead.  Under this analysis, Spielman’s claim under 
the Lanham Act is not likely to prevail.  The banners in question 
depict an image of Spielman while he was playing football for 
OSU.  The Defendants will likely be able to successfully defend 
 
109.  Id. at 1245 (citing Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999). 
110.  Brown, 724 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999). 
111.  Id. 
112.  Id. at 1246. 
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these claims by asserting the position that they did not explicitly 
mislead consumers as to Spielman’s affiliation with Honda or 
Nike by hanging a large picture of Spielman in a stadium in 
which he used to play, and that the banners amount to artistic 
expression. 
 
F. Deceptive Trade Practices 
 
The Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act is essentially the 
State’s version of the Lanham Act.  In Chandler & Associates, 
Inc. v. America’s Healthcare Alliance, Inc. the Court stated that 
“[w]hen adjudicating claims under the Ohio Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act, Ohio courts shall apply the same analysis 
applicable to claims commenced under analogous federal law.”113  
However, being found liable for violations of the Lanham Act 
does not necessarily mean that the defendant would be held 
liable under Ohio law, unless the case involves a trademark.114  
Spielman’s Complaint does not claim that his name, injury, and 
likeness is trademarked.115  The Ohio law and the Lanham Act 
are similar in that they both prohibit behavior that causes the 
likelihood of confusion as to the affiliation of one person or entity 
with another.116 
 
G. Right of Publicity 
 
The philosophy behind Right of Publicity or Personality 
Rights is the idea that “it is the inherent right of every human 
being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.”117  In 
the state of Ohio, any person who owns all of their rights of 
publicity may bring a civil action to enforce those rights.118  A 
person would not be able to sue if the entity using their identity 
 
113.  ERNST, supra note 87, at § 56:16 (quoting 709 N.E.2d 190, 195 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1997)). 
114.  Id. 
115.  See generally Class Action Complaint, supra note 1. 
116.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02 (West 2018); see also Lanham Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
117.  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d 
ed. Westlaw 2018). 
118.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.06 (West 2018). 
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is authorized to do so.  The action brought would be a commercial 
tort of unfair competition,119 so the Ohio law imitates the 
Lanham Act in this way. 
In Vinci v. American Can Co., an Olympic weight lifter and 
a class of other Olympic athletes brought an action for invasion 
of privacy for the use of name, image, and likeness on a series of 
promotional drinking cups.120  The Ohio Court of Appeals stated 
in its opinion that “[n]o one has the right to [sue] merely because 
his name or his appearance is brought before the public, since 
neither is in any way a private matter and both are open to 
public observation.”121  When the defendant uses the plaintiff’s 
name, image, and likeness, and the value of that therein, and 
appropriates the value for its own commercial benefit, then the 
plaintiff’s rights are invaded. 
In an interview regarding this lawsuit, Spielman clarified 
his position by saying, “Ohio State is more than welcome to use 
my name and image in any way they want to use it.  The problem 
is when they slap a corporate sponsor on it.”122  With this 
statement, Spielman addresses the issue the Court is likely to 
consider when analyzing his state law claims.  It is no secret that 
Spielman played for OSU, so there is no harm done when OSU, 
or anyone for that matter, hangs his picture up somewhere.  A 
situation such as this is no different than printing his name, 
image, and likeness in a newspaper, as the Vinci Court 
commented.123  However, Spielman’s reputation has value, and 
he is entitled to profit from that value.  When another entity 
appropriates that value for its own commercial benefit, in this 
case through corporate sponsorships, then harm is done.  If OSU 
had simply hung his picture up to improve the aesthetic of the 
 
119.  MCCARTHY, supra note 119. 
120.  591 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio Ct. App.1990). 
121.   Id. at 794 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 
N.E.2d 454, 458 n.4 (Ohio 1976)). 
122.  Chris Spielman Files Lawsuit Against Ohio State to Block Use of 
Player Images, FREE REPUBLIC (July 15, 2017, 5:51 AM), http://www.free 
republic.com/focus/f-chat/3569383/posts. 
123.  Vinci, 591 N.E.2d at 794 (stating “[t]he fact that the defendant is 
engaged in the business of publication, for example of a newspaper, out of 
which he makes or seeks to make a profit, is not enough to make the incidental 
publication a commercial use of the name or likeness.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Zacchini, 351 N.E.2d at 458 n.4)). 
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stadium, which in turn would likely draw more fans to the game, 
it would seem that OSU is deriving a commercial benefit from 
the use of his name, image, and likeness; however, that is not 
necessarily prohibited.  Because OSU profited from the banners 
through the corporate sponsorships of Honda and Nike, the 
necessary appropriation of value required to be held liable under 
this law seems to be present. 
 
V. Discussion: The Possible Impact of a Favorable 
Decision for Spielman 
 
It is important to remember how Spielman’s and 
O’Bannon’s cases are different—the biggest difference being the 
Defendants; O’Bannon sued the NCAA, while Spielman is suing 
OSU and IMG.  The NCAA refused to settle with O’Bannon, and 
the case was brought all the way to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  OSU might be more willing to settle this case before it 
gets that far.  However, judging from the comments Spielman 
has made regarding his goals in pursuing this lawsuit,124 it is 
likely that Spielman will forego the opportunity to settle in order 
to have the case litigated in federal court. 
In light of that consideration, if this case is brought before 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, then there would be two 
Circuit Courts that agree that former college athletes should be 
able to negotiate compensation for the use of their name, image, 
and likeness.  The Supreme Court of the United States declined 
to grant certiorari to the defendants in O’Bannon.  Should the 
Ninth and Sixth Circuits agree, then the Supreme Court would 
likely decline to hear Spielman’s case as well.  A favorable 
decision may encourage other similarly situated people not 
named in Spielman’s class to pursue claims such as this in other 
jurisdictions.  A favorable decision for Spielman creates more 
precedent that is likely to weigh heavily in favor of those possible 
plaintiffs.  Schools across the country and their licensing agents 
may be subject to duplicative lawsuits that they would have 
difficulty defending based on that precedent.  A victory for 
 
124.  Athletic Staff, supra note 7.  (noting that Spielman’s stated concern 
is the exploitation of all former players, and that he does not have a financial 
interest in the outcome). 
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Spielman in this case will likely continue to change the 
landscape of how college athletes are, or are not, compensated 
for the use of their name, image, and likeness much like 
O’Bannon has done. 
If former players are given this firm footing to stand on 
when making these claims, it may open the door for current 
players to negotiate compensation for use of their name, image, 
and likeness.  If that happens, then the NCAA’s rules against 
compensation could be in jeopardy.  If current players are 
allowed to be compensated for the use of their personal features, 
then this could potentially lead to them being compensated for 
other purposes, such as for their athletic abilities. 
Allowing current players to receive compensation at the 
very least could affect the NCAA’s ability to prohibit athletes 
from organizing a union.  With union representation, college 
athletes may be able to negotiate benefits much the same way 
that the players’ unions in professional sports have done.  The 
goal of the fairly recent attempt to organize by college football 
players at Northwestern University was to prevent players from 
having to pay the bills for injuries they received while playing 
college sports.125  With all of the discussions regarding how 
dangerous head injuries are, especially in the NFL,126 this could 
be a huge financial burden for the NCAA and participating 
schools.127 
In this way, Spielman’s case represents something so much 
larger than his ability to profit from his reputation.  It 
represents an idea that is so uniquely American—that people 
should be paid for the value they hold in the market and for what 
they contribute and sacrifice for the sake of commerce.  If a 
favorable decision in Spielman’s case follows the trajectory of the 
argument put forth, then college athletics will experience such a 
significant change that it may form a totally different market 
from what the NCAA is today.  The usual path of athletes going 
 
125.  Loretta8, supra note 6. 
126.  Brian Resnick, What a Lifetime of Playing Football Can Do to the 
Human Brain, VOX (Feb. 3, 2019, 10:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-
health/2018/2/2/16956440/super-bowl-2018-concussion-cte-nfl-brain-damage. 
127.  Ken Belson, N.F.L. Agrees to Settle Concussion Suit for $765 Million, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/ 
sports/football/judge-announces-settlement-in-nfl-concussion-suit.html. 
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from high school to college and then to professional leagues could 
become a thing of the past in lieu of some other alternative, such 
as new leagues where up-and-coming athletes can compete in a 
league similar to the NCAA without having to simultaneously 
attend school. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Assuming that Spielman is able to achieve class action 
status on his federal claims and the judge in the District Court 
of Ohio rules that the case should be heard in federal court 
rather than the Ohio Court of Claims, there is an opportunity to 
have the case brought before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
This is significant because there was already a similar case 
brought before the Ninth Circuit.128  If Spielman’s case gets that 
far, it will be significant regardless of the outcome.  If the Sixth 
Circuit makes a decision that is different from the Ninth 
Circuit’s, then there will a circuit split, and the Supreme Court 
of the United States may decide to grant certiorari.  If the Sixth 
Circuit decides to follow the precedent set in the Ninth Circuit, 
then similar lawsuits may be filed in the future with the 
jurisprudence of two circuit courts weighing heavily in favor of 
the plaintiffs. 
The NCAA’s rules against compensation state that no 
college player can receive payment for their contributions to 
athletics—they may not enter into licensing deals or contracts 
with agencies and they may not be associated with any 
professional team in any way.129  The Supreme Court has held 
that the NCAA is a market because the goods and services that 
they offer cannot be found elsewhere.130  College athletes are 
participants in this market.  Because of the rules against 
compensation, these market participants can argue that the 
NCAA rules unreasonably restrain trade. 
The Sherman Act is a federal statute that promotes and 
maintains the free market that is inherent to the American 
 
128.  See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 
1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
129.  Amateurism, supra note 11. 
130.  See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 
U.S. 85 (1984). 
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economy.  The free market relies on competition between 
businesses, and any attempt to restrain trade through 
monopolies and trusts is prohibited.131  The Supreme Court has 
held that the NCAA is subject to anti-trust scrutiny under the 
Sherman Act.132  Unless the NCAA can provide sufficient 
arguments that their compensation rules promote a pro-
competitive purpose, then its compensation rules may be in 
jeopardy. 
The banners that depict Spielman’s image, which are the 
subject of his lawsuit, are an infringement of his rights of 
publicity under the Lanham Act and Ohio State law because 
they are likely to cause confusion as to who Spielman is affiliated 
with.  It is reasonable to assume that someone seeing Spielman 
on these corporate-sponsored banners would believe that 
Spielman is in some way associated with those corporations; 
however, he is not. 
Whether Spielman is successful in these claims largely 
depends on the analysis that the Court uses.  Depending on the 
analysis, the issue becomes one of the following: whether the use 
of Spielman’s name, image, and likeness is likely to cause 
confusion as to his affiliations, whether the banners have artistic 
relevance, and whether OSU explicitly misled consumers as to 
Spielman’s affiliations.133  If the Court decides that consumers 
were misled by OSU, Spielman will have more difficulty 
succeeding in his claims under the Lanham Act.  In order to 
succeed in his state law right of publicity claim, Spielman will 
have to show that the value of his name, image, and likeness was 
appropriated to another entity by OSU.134  Because the banners 
were sponsored and the resulting revenue went to OSU, rather 
than Spielman, it is likely he will be able to succeed in this claim. 
Spielman’s best argument is that he is no longer subject to 
NCAA regulations because he is no longer a collegiate athlete.  
Therefore, the NCAA’s rules against compensation should not 
apply to him despite the fact that the name, image, and likeness 
 
131.  Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). 
132.  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. 85. 
133.  See generally Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, 
Inc., 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1982); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 
996 (2d Cir. 1989). 
134.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02 (West 2018). 
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in question came from a time when he was subject to NCAA 
regulations.  The fact that Spielman maintained a valuable 
reputation while he was a member of the NCAA should not bar 
him from profiting from that reputation after his membership 
ended.  It is also important to note that the NCAA is not a party 
in this lawsuit, as Spielman is suing OSU and IMG.135 
Regardless of how this case is decided, it will be significant 
to current and former NCAA athletes.  Success for Spielman 
could mean sweeping changes to form and execution of amateur 
athletics as we know it. 
 
 
135.  Class Action Complaint, supra note 1.  
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